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I. INTRODUCTION: BACK TO THE BEGINNING
The constitutional status of Indian tribes within the framework of
the American Republic has been elusive from the very beginning.
This essential point was acknowledged by the Supreme Court itself in
the early case of Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, where it noted that "the
relation of the Indians to the United States is marked by peculiar and
cardinal distinctions which exist nowhere else."2  Despite this ac-
knowledgment, the Court proceeded then, and has ever since, to rou-
tinely decide cases about the nature of tribal sovereignty and its in-
teraction with the federal and state sovereigns with almost no
reference to any constitutional benchmarks or limitations.'
This approach-although it has waxed and waned doctrinally4-
has been consistently underpinned by a pragmatic necessity to decide
Professor of Law, University of South Dakota School of Law.
30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
2 Id. at 16.
3 For example, since 1986, the Court has decided almost 40 Indian law cases. In fact, tribal
interests prevailed in only nine cases, or 22.5% of the total. See David H. Getches, Beyond Indian
Law: The Rehnquist Court's Pursuit of States' Rights, Color-Blind Justice and Mainstream Values, 86
MINN. L. REv. 267, 280 (2001). None of the cases turned on constitutional questions. See id. at
280-85.
4 The Supreme Court has routinely found that Congress' power in Indian affairs is para-
mount and without apparent limitation. According to the Court and scholars, this power flows
from either the Indian Commerce Clause that contains a very expansive plenary component or
from a plenary power that transcends any constitutional grounding. See, for example, Getches,
supra note 3, at 269-72 endorsing the former view, but see also the widespread scholarly criti-
cism collected by Professor Clinton:
The legitimacy of federal assertions of such sweeping unilateral authority frequently is
proclaimed in Indian country. Indeed, scholars consistently have questioned the pur-
ported doctrine of plenary federal authority over Indians because of the lack of any tex-
tual roots for the doctrine in the Constitution, the breadth of its implications, and the
lack of any tribal consent to such broad federal authority. Therefore, many commenta-
tors have sought out limits on that authority. See[, e.]g., [Milner S.] Ball, Constitution,
Court, Indian Tribes, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 1. (suggesting lack of textual authority
for plenary powers); RUSSELL BARSH & JAMES HENDERSON, THE ROAD: INDIAN TRIBES AND
POLITICAL LIBERTY 257-69 (1980) (suggesting limitations derived from Article I and the
Ninth Amendment); Robert N. Clinton, Isolated in Their Own Country: A Defense of Federal
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cases in a real and changing world despite the absence of any signifi-
cant constitutional guidance. Indian tribes were here at the begin-
ning of the nation and they continue as dynamic sovereigns in the
current political and legal landscape. Indeed, it is this very persis-
tence that threatens to shatter the unspoken compact of constitu-
tional silence.5 And even if it does not, it is time to bring the miner's
canary up to the surface for a breath of fresh air."
It is the goal of this brief essay to discuss the structure of the Con-
stitution in regard to Indian tribes and the early and seminal ap-
proach of the Supreme Court of John Marshall to the legal status of
Indian tribes. This essay will also explore the sweep of western ex-
pansion that caused the development of legal doctrine that was
clearly extra-constitutional, if not anti-constitutional, with regard to
Indian tribes. Finally, this article discusses the constitutional crisis
suggested by the recent case of United States v. Enas,7 and a prelimi-
nary sketch of how this constitutional issue might be addressed with a
greater sense of respect and permanency.
Protection of Indian Autonomy and Self-Government, 33 STAN. L. REv. 979, 996-1001 (1981)
(suggesting inherent limits in the reach of the Indian commerce clause); Richard B.
Collins, Indian Consent to American Government, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 365 (1989) (arguing for
Indian consent as a limitation on federal authority); Robert T. Coulter, The Denial of Le-
gal Remedies to Indian Nations Under U.S. Law, in RE-THINKING INDIAN LAW 103, 106 (Na-
tional Lawyers Guild, Committee on Native American Struggles ed., 1982) ("[T]here is
not textual support in the Constitution for the proposition that Congress has plenary
authority over Indian nations."); Nell jessup Newton, Federal Power over Indians: Its Sources,
Scope, and Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 195, 261-67 (1984) (suggesting due process and
takings limitations).
Robert N. Clinton, Tribal Courts and the Federal Union, 26 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 841, 856 n.41
(1990). This notion of plenary power finds its classic formulation in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187
U.S. 553, 565 (1903) ("Plenary authority over the tribal relations of the Indians has been exer-
cised by Congress from the beginning and the power has always been deemed a political one,
not subject to be controlled by the judicial department of the government."). The "political
question" component of the doctrine has been slightly eroded in the modem era. Both Dela-
ware Tribal Business Committee v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73 (1977), and United States v. Sioux Nation of In-
dians, 448 U.S. 371 (1980), indicate that acts of Congress in Indian affairs are subject to judicial
review in accordance with the rational basis test. This level of judicial scrutiny is minimal at
best. See, e.g., FRANKPOMMERSHEIM, BRAID OFFEATHERS 46-48 (1995).
"5 See discussion infra sections IV and VI.
This is a classic Indian law metaphor:
[T]he Indian plays much the same role in our American society that the Jews played in
Germany. Like the miner's canary, the Indian marks the shifts from fresh air to poison
gas in our political atmosphere; and our treatment of Indians, even more than our
treatment of other minorities, reflects the rise and fall in our democratic faith.
Felix S. Cohen, The Erosion of Indian Rights, 1950-1953: A Case Study in Bureaucracy, 62 YALE L.J.
348, 390 (1953). Despite this powerful (and oft cited) language, much of Felix Cohen's work
acknowledged and endorsed Congress' plenary power in Indian affairs as a necessary trade-off
for recognition of a tribal right to exist and engage in self-governance. See, for example, the
extensive discussion in Dalia Tsuk, The New Deal Origins of American Legal Pluralism, 29 FL. ST.
U. L. REV. 189 (2001).
7 255 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 2001).
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II. INDIANS, INDIAN TRIBES, AND THE STRUCTURE OF
THE CONSTITUTION
8
Indians are mentioned once in the Constitution. Indian tribes
are also mentioned once. 9 Both of these mentions are more exclusive
than inclusive and served to place Indians and Indian tribes at the
margins of the American political fabric. Indians are identified in Ar-
ticle I, Section 2 on the apportionment of representatives and direct
taxes in the negative as "excluding Indians not taxed." 0 This descrip-
tion, certainly not surprising in 1789, did not recognize Indians as
participants in the American polity." As a result, it is necessarily diffi-
cult to envision the primary political/cultural units of native affilia-
tion with their tribes as fully integrated within the structure of the
Constitution.
Yet there is some ambiguity in this line of analysis. Indian tribes
are specifically mentioned in what is known as the Indian Commerce
Clause where Congress is recognized to have the power "to regulate
commerce with foreign Nations and among the several states and
with the Indian tribes."' 2  This textual reference clearly recognizes
some kind of significant and enduring sovereignty in Indian tribes as
it is specifically identified in a series that includes the states and for-
eign nations. Nevertheless, the clause does not spell out the scope of
authority for any of these entities as constitutional subjects, but
merely identifies them as legitimate objects for the exercise of con-
gressional authority.
8 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 ("Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned
among the several States ... and excluding In dians not taxed, three fifths of all other Per-
sons."). This language was preserved in the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, although the
three-fifths rule was abolished.
9 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. In addition, Indian tribes are comprehended within the
treaty-making power at Article II, Section 2, clause 2. Treaties clearly recognize tribal sover-
eignty and are a marker of constitutional status, but they are subject to unilateral abrogation
under the plenary power doctrine. See POMMERSHEIM, supra note 4, at 38-41.
10 U.S. CONS-r. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
" Indians did not become U.S. citizens until the Citizenship Act of 1924, 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b)
(2000). See generally DAVID GETCHES, ET AL., FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 163-65 (4th ed. 1998). Issues
about state citizenship lingered even longer. See, e.g., Earl M. Maltz, The Fourteenth Amendment
and Native American Citizenship, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 555 (2000); Frank Pommersheim, Democ-
racy, Citizenship, and Indian Law Literacy: Some Initial Thoughts, 14 T.M. COOLEYL. REV. 457, 462-
64 (1997).
12 The Indian Commerce Clause derives from Article IX of the Articles of Confederation,
which granted Congress "the sole and exclusive right and power of... regulating the trade and
managing all affairs with the Indians, not members of any of the states, provided that the legis-
lative right of any state within its own limits be not infringed or violated .... " ARTICLES OF
CONFEDERATION OF 1777, art. IX. The ambiguity of this language and its subsequent change in
the Constitution is discussed in MONROE PRICE & ROBERT CLINTON, LAW AND THE AMERICAN
INDIAN 131-32 (2d ed. 1983).
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The Indian Commerce Clause has often been used not to demar-
cate tribal sovereignty within a constitutional republic, but as a source
of congressional authority to legislate with regard to Indian tribes.
This is, of course, structurally self-evident. Yet it has also proved ex-
tremely problematic as Congress has consistently legislated in Indian
affairs well beyond the parameters of "commerce," and the justifica-
tion for such legislation has pushed beyond the text of the Constitu-
tion into the realm of plenary power."
The Indian Commerce Clause standing alone is hardly remark-
able, but what is remarkable is the fact that the rest of the textual
space in the Constitution makes no reference to Indian tribes.14 It is
this paucity of additional constitutional text that has always made it
difficult to discern an adequate constitutional footing with which to
parse tribal sovereignty and its relationship to the two other constitu-
tionally defined sovereigns, namely the states and the federal gov-
ernment.
15
III. THE MARSHALL TRILOGY: ESTABLISHING A FOUNDATION
Despite this constitutional shortfall, early on the Supreme Court
had to confront basic questions left unanswered (even unasked) in
the Constitution concerning the authority of Indian tribes and their
relationship to the other enumerated sovereigns. This considerable
task was primarily undertaken in the cases of Johnson v. McIntosh,1
6
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia," and Worcester v. Georgia l" popularly known
as the Marshall trilogy. In these cases, the Court confronted basic
questions about the nature of Indian property rights, whether the
Cherokee Nation was a "foreign nation" capable of bringing an origi-
nal action in the Supreme Court against the State of Georgia, and
whether the laws of the State of Georgia (rather than the laws of the
tribe) governed the actions of a non-Indian within the Cherokee Na-
tion Reservation.
13 See discussion supra note 4 and infra Part IV.
14 See discussion infra Part VI. See also POMMERSHEIM, supra note 4, at 39 ("In examining this
relationship, one is struck almost immediately by the absence of any true constitutional bench-
mark to orient the federal-tribal discourse on sovereignty.").
15 See POMMERSHEIM, supra note 4, at 40-41. In fact, treaty federalism is the doctrinal founda-
tion for potentionally amending the constitution to reflect this fact. See infra notes 73-82 and
accompanying text.
16 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823) (holding that upon "discovery" by European nations, tribes
lost the power to transfer land without consent of the discovering nation and to engage in ex-
ternal relations with other nations).
17 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831) (holding that Indian tribes are "domestic dependent nations,"
not foreign nations).
18 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832) (holding that state laws do not govern non-Indians within In-
dian reservations because of federal preemption and tribal sovereignty).
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In each of these cases, the Court reached for doctrinal guidance
outside the confines of the Constitution. In Johnson v. McIntosh, the
Court relied on the "doctrine of discovery"'9 in order to conclude that
title to land held by Indian tribes nevertheless resided in the United
States because of its superior arts, civilization and religion.2° What
remained to tribes was a residual right of use and occupancy of the
land.2'
In Cherokee Nation, the Court concluded that the Cherokee Nation
was not a foreign nation for Article III purposes because it was dis-
tinctly delineated as different from a foreign nation in the Indian
Commerce Clause. 22 Despite this constitutional reference, the Court
went on to expound its jurisprudential notion that tribes were "do-. • ,,23
mestic dependent nations whose relationship to the federal gov-
ernment was like that of a "ward to his guardian.2 4 These concep-
tions were not explained in any detail. The Court also acknowledged
the importance of treaties, tribal self-government, and the federal-
tribal relationship as essential elements in understanding the nature
of tribes.25
Finally in Worcester, the Court held that the state laws of Georgia
had no effect within the boundaries of the Cherokee Nation. 2' The
rationale of the Court again focused on the importance of Cherokee
self-governance, treaties between the United States and the Cherokee
Nation, and prior federal legislation as effectively preventing the im-
position of state law within the Cherokee Nation. 27 The Court identi-
fied Indian nations as "distinct, independent political communities,
retaining their original natural rights .... "28
The Cherokee cases almost brooked their own constitutional cri-
sis. The state of Georgia refused to submit briefs and did not appear
at oral argument.29 In addition, prior to the Cherokee Nation case,
Chief Justice Marshall issued a writ of habeas corpus in the case of
George Corn Tassel, a Cherokee who was convicted in state court of
killing another Indian on Cherokee land. The basis for the writ was
that under the applicable treaty the Cherokees were entitled to try
tribal members in their own courts. The Georgia state legislature was
19 Johnson, 21 U.S. at 573-74.
20 Id. at 573.
21 Id. at 574.
22 Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 16-17.
23 Id. at 17.
24 Id.
25 See id.
26 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 562-63 (1832) (reversing the state criminal con-
viction of Rev. Samuel Worcester for preaching in the Cherokee Nation without a state license).
27 Id. at 549-63.
28 Id. at 559.
29 See GETCHES, supra note 11, at 95-126; see also generally 0.
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not impressed. It condemned the Chief Justice's "interference" and
Mr. Tassel was hanged five days later.30
Subsequent to the Worcester decision, President Jackson purport-
edl y said, 'John Marshall has made his decision; now let him enforce
it." ' While others consider the statement apocryphal, there is no
doubt that President Jackson supported Georgia's claimed sover-
eignty over Cherokee land.32 The constitutional imbroglio was only
averted when the impending nullification crisis convinced President
Jackson that such a constitutional crisis was not in the national inter-
est.
33
The essential teachings that derive from the Marshall trilogy and
form the foundational basis of Indian law are the recognition of tribal
sovereignty and self-government, federal exclusivity in dealing with
Indian tribes as a basic tenet of an emerging federalism, a unique
federal-tribal relationship often identified as the trust relationship,
and, as a necessary corollary, the absence of any inherent state
authority in Indian affairs.34
IV. THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE: EXPANSION, INCORPORATION, AND
THE PLENARY POWER DOCTRINE
The Marshallian foundation assumed a static landscape where In-
dian territory was largely distinct from state territory, federal territory,
and privately held territory, and there were few, if any, non-Indians
who permanently resided on, or frequented the reservation. Reserva-
tions, particularly in the context of western expansion, were seen as
islands of Indianness preserving a "measured separatism" between
tribes and states, Indians and non-Indians.s Tribal sovereignty ex-
isted, but mostly at the margins of the more precise constitutional
sovereignty of the federal government and the states.
Indian tribes began their interaction with the federal government
as sovereign entities largely outside the Republic, but over time they
were absorbed more and more into the Republic, eventually becom-
ing internal sovereigns of a limited kind. This process is typified by
the General Allotment Act, 4 which for the first time brought signifi-
I0 Id. at 104.
31 Id. at 123. For a discussion of the aftermath of the Worcester decision, see HORACE
GREELEY, THE AMERICAN CONFLICT 106 (1864); MARQUISJAMES, THE LIFE OF ANDREWJACKSON
603-24 (1938); Joseph C. Burke, The Cherokee Cases: A Study in Law, Politics, and Morality, 21 STAN.
L. REV. 500, 525-26 (1969).
SeeGETCHES, supra note 11, at 123.
3Id.
M See, e.g., Getches, supra note 3, at 269-74, 352-53.
See, e.g., POMMERSHEIM, supra note 4, at 11-36. The term "measured separatism" comes
from CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW 4 (1987).
25 U.S.C. § 334 (1887).
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cant numbers of non-Indian people to many reservations as perma-
nent, land-holding residents. 37- This process is most accurately charac-
terized as one of involuntary annexation. Throughout the eight-
eenth and nineteenth centuries and continuing well into the early
twentieth century, Indian people were neither federal nor state citi-
zens. Their physical and political incorporation was not justified by
any coherent legal theory and is, arguably, directly at odds with sev-
eral key legal and political premises established in the U.S. Constitu-
tion. These premises, drawn largely from the work of the political
philosopher John Locke, include the principles of limited govern-
mental sovereignty and consent of the governed. 8 As suggested by
Professor Robert Clinton, "[i] n Lockean social compact terms, Indian
tribes never entered into or consented to any constitutional contract
by which they agreed to be governed by federal or state authority,
rather than tribal sovereignty."3 9
The principle identified by Professor Clinton is, in fact, the essen-
tial core jurisprudence of the seminal cases of Cherokee Nation and
Worcester. Describing Indian tribes as "domestic dependent nations '
and "distinct independent political communities 41 respectively, Chief
Justice Marshall's opinions in these cases placed tribes largely outside
the state and national polities. Like so much federal Indian law, the
tides of history, if not compelling legal analysis, have nearly obliter-
ated these insights. Subsequent cases in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, particularly United States v. Kagam42 and Lone
Hitchcock4 fully incorporated tribes into the national systemWolf v.H c cflyicroae bsitth inlytm
and declared them subject to the "plenary power" of Congress.
These cases, of course, made no mention of incorporation, but
seemed to realize that the Indian Commerce Clause, while adequate
when tribes were largely outside the Republic, was inadequate to deal
37 See, POMMERSHEIM, supra note 4, at 19-23 (noting the political and social effects attendant
on the loss nationwide of over 90 million acres of tribal land to non-Indians).
38 See POMMERSHEIM, supra note 4, at 48-50.
39 Clinton, supra note 4, at 847.
40 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
41 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832).
42 118 U.S. 375, 384-85 (1886):
The power of the General Government over these remnants of a race once powerful,
now weak and diminished in numbers, is necessary to their protection, as well as to the
safety of those among whom they dwell. It must exist in that government [i.e., federal
government], because it never has existed anywhere else, because the theatre of its exer-
cise is within the geographical limits of the United States, because it has never been de-
nied, and because it alone can enforce its laws on all the tribes.
Kagama also expressly rejected the Indian Commerce Clause as sufficient authorization for the
Major Crimes Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1153 (2000), dealing with major crimes committed by Indians
and thus gave birth to plenary power as a source of authority to sustain wide-ranging congres-
sional legislation. Kagama, 118 U.S. at 378-79.
43 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903).
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with tribes when they were more and more inside the Republic.
Hence, the creation of plenary power in Congress. Despite its lack of
constitutional roots, this power nevertheless proclaims extensive-
even limitless-power over tribes in blatant contradiction of the
Lockean notion of limited government sovereignty. The plenary
power doctrine appears to be extraconstitutional in its origins and
extravagant in its placement of unlimited authority in the hands of
the Congress at the expense of tribal sovereignty.44
This vast expansion of federal authority in Indian affairs signifi-
cantly constrained the parameters of tribal sovereignty. For example,
as Justice Stewart wrote in United States v. Wheeler, "[t] he sovereignty
that Indian tribes retain is of a unique and limited character. It exists
only at the sufferance of Congress and is subject to complete defea-
sance."45 This language finds no support within the text of the Con-
stitution, but apparently is justified by the process of incorporation
wherein "[t]heir incorporation within the territory of the United
States... necessarily divested them of some aspects of the sovereignty
which they had previously exercised."4 Within a national jurispru-
dence that recognizes the primacy of order, limits, and predictability
within the legal system, such pronouncements seem especially
crabbed and destabilizing, and of questionable constitutional validity.
This poverty of constitutional theory concerning tribal sovereignty
and attendant federal limits contrasts sharply with the constitutional
and theoretical solidity that governs the interaction of the federal and
state sovereigns. The Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution is
the cornerstone of the dynamic relationship with its declaration that
" [t] he powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respec-
tively, or to the people."47 The Tenth Amendment provides a clear
constitutional marker for discussions of federal-state sovereignty,
while discussion of federal-tribal sovereignty takes place largely out-
side the text of the constitution.
44 POMMERSHEIM, supra note 4, at 38-40. Professor Phil Frickey has suggested that plenary
power ought not be a congressional sword used against tribes but more as a shield against state
regulation in Indian country. See Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, Con-
stitutionalism, and Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 381, 395 (1993). Yet this
benign approach has not been consistently followed by Congress, and the Supreme Court itself
has increasingly taken up the sword.
45 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978).
4 Id.
47 U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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V. THE DURO CASE, THE DURO OVERRIDE, AND THE SUBSEQUENT
JUDICIAL RESPONSE: A CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS REVEALED
The state of affairs established by the plenary power doctrine-
though severely criticized by scholars-has been routinely and uni-
formly accepted by the federal courts. 4' This pragmatic regime, de-
spite the absence of any constitutional authorization, unquestionably
has held sway until a recent series of events inaugurated by the case
of Duro v. Reina5° and its legislative aftermath.
Duro is the most recent case in which the Supreme Court consid-
ered the nature of tribal criminal jurisdiction over various categories
of defendants. Previously, the Court held that tribes did not have in-
herent criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians because it was inconsis-
tent with their dependent status,5 but they did have inherent crimi-
nal jurisdiction to prosecute tribal members."
In Duro, the Court considered the question of whether tribal
courts possessed criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians.55
The Court answered the question in the negative. The result was not
premised on any constitutional or statutory analysis, but rather on a
historical inquiry of sorts that concluded that such authority "was a
power necessarily surrendered by the tribes in their submission to the
overriding sovereignty of the United States."54 This language does
not flow from any constitutional grammar. Indeed, it seems more
rooted in an unwritten colonizing text that permeates the process of
"incorporation." Note, too, that this was not Congress' plenary power
in action. This was the Supreme Court's own venture into the ple-
nary realm.55
48 See, e.g., the sources quoted supra note 4 and accompanying text.
49 See supra note 4 and accompanying text. Yet the Court, itself, has occasionally admitted
some doctrinal "confusion." See, as an example, McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission,
411 U.S. 164, 172 n.7 (1973), where the Court observed that "[t]he source of federal authority
over Indian matters has been the subject of some confusion, but it is now generally recognized
that the power derives from federal responsibility for regulating commerce with Indian tribes
and for treaty making." Yet this "confusion" has never curbed federal authority in Indian af-
fairs.
495 U.S. 676 (1990) (finding that tribes do not have criminal jurisdiction over nonmem-
ber Indians).
51 Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
52 United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323-24 (1978).
A nonmember Indian is an Indian person who is not a member of the tribe on whose
reservation the alleged crime took place. See Duro, 495 U.S. 676.
5 Id. at 693.
55 See, e.g., Frank Pommersheim, Tribal Courts and the Federal Judiciary: Opportunities and Chal-
lengesfora Constitutional Democracy, 58 MONT. L. REV. 313, 328 (1997):
The plenary power doctrine can now be seen as coming in two distinct vintages. There is
the classic doctrine of congressional plenary power as established in Lone Wolf. Yet even
if Congress has not acted-where one would normally presuppose an unimpaired tribal
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In this rare instance, however, Congress stepped into the fray. As
a result of substantial pressure from Indian country about the likely
void of criminal law enforcement occasioned by the decision, Con-
gress passed legislation amending the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968
to read as follows:
"[flowers of self-government" means and includes all governmental
powers possessed by an Indian tribe, executive, legislative, and judicial,
and all offices, bodies, and tribunals by and through which they are exe-
cuted, including courts of Indian offenses; and means the inherent power of
Indian tribe hereby recognized and affirmed, to exercise criminal jurisdiction over
all Indians."
This legislative action is popularly known as the Duro override. Even
at the time of its passage, several scholars noted likely constitutional
problems, especially in the context of separation-of-power concerns."
As forecast, litigation involving the meaning and constitutional integ-
rity of the Duro override promptly ensued.
All of the challenges arose in the identical context. A nonmem-
ber Indian defendant was successfully prosecuted in tribal court for a
crime committed on the reservation and then charged in federal
court for a crime arising out of the same set of facts. The consistent
defense proffered in these cases was a double jeopardy claim arguing
that a subsequent prosecution in federal court after a tribal court
conviction violated the double jeopardy clause.
Although United States v. Wheeler held that the federal and tribal
governments were separate sovereigns for double jeopardy purposes,
defendants in these cases claimed a new wrinkle was created by the
Duro legislation. They claimed-despite the plain statutory text to
the contrary-that the Duro legislation was a federal delegation of
authority to tribes and therefore tribes were not separate sovereigns
in this instance and the double jeopardy clause did apply.
The cases in the Eighth and Ninth Circuits took various ap-
proaches. As noted by the en banc Ninth Circuit majority in United
States v. Enas, "[f] ew of these decisions have taken the same approach
and each of the appellate panels has been divided, suggesting the
underlying difficulty of the issue."" In Means v. Northern Cheyenne
Tribal Court,59 an earlier panel of the Ninth Circuit in a 2-1 decision
decided that the Duro override legislation was indeed a delegation:
sovereignty-the Court now recognizes a judicial plenary power to parse the limits of
tribal court authority based on federal common law.
25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2002) (emphasis added).
57 See, e.g., Philip S. Deloria & Nelljessup Newton, The CriminalJurisdiction of Tribal Courts over
Non-member Indians, 38 FED. B. NEWS &J. 70, 73 (March 1991) ("The [1990 Amendment] raises
complex and subtle issues of constitutional law, especially relating to separation of powers.").
N9 United States v. Enas, 255 F.3d 662, 671 (9th Cir. 2001).
59 154 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 1998).
[Vol. 5:2
CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS IN INDIAN LA W
While the legislative history of [the 1990 amendments] suggests that
Congress did not intend to delgate... to the tribes [the authority to
prosecute non-member Indians], that is essentially the amendments' ef-
fect. While Congress is always free to amend laws it believes the Supreme
Court has misinterpreted, it cannot somehow erase the fact that the
Court did interpret the prior law. In other words, once the Supreme
Court has ruled that the law is "X," Congress can come back and say, "no,
the law is '," but it cannot say that the law was never "X" or always
'N."... Thus, regardless of the Congress' intent to declare that the tribes
always had the inherent authority to try non-member Indians, that simply
cannot be what the amendments accomplished. 60
The Eighth Circuit also interpreted the meaning of the Duro legis-
lation, reaching a different result than the Means case, although the
permutations were similar. The District Court in U.S. v. Weaselheadc[
decided that the decisions in Duro (and Oliphant) were matters of
federal common law subject to congressional override:
It is axiomatic that the legitimacy of the federal common law is contin-
gent upon the presence of a connection, however tenuous, to a determi-
nation of congressional intent. Accordingly, if a judicial body errs in de-
termining congressional intent, Congress can pennissibly legislate a
correction. [The 1990 amendments] constitute such a correction.
A divided panel of the Eighth Circuit reversed.63  The majority
concluded that matters of tribal sovereignty had constitutional impli-
cations and therefore the Supreme Court, not Congress, had the final
word:
We conclude that ascertainment of first principles regarding the position
of Indian tribes within our constitutional structure of government is a
matter ultimately entrusted to the Court and thus beyond the scope of
Congress's authority to alter retroactively by legislative fiat. Fundamen-
tal, ab initio matters of constitutional history should not be committed to
"shifting legislative majorities" free to arbitrarily interpret and reorder
the organic law as public sentiment veers in one direction or another.64
60 Id. at 946 (internal citations omitted). Judge Reinhardt reached a different conclusion as
to the effect of the 1990 amendments. Looking to the language and legislative history of the
amendments, he concluded that "Congress did not intend to delegate jurisdiction to the
tribes;" rather, he determined, Congress clearly intended to "recognize" that Indian tribes al-
ways had jurisdiction over nonmember Indians, Duro notwithstanding. Id. at 950-51 (Rein-
hardtJ., concurring).
61 36 F. Supp. 2d 908 (D. Neb. 1997).
Id. at 914.
63 156 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 1998).
Id at 824. Judge Arnold dissented, noting: "Chief Justice Marshall made no intimation
that the Constitution had anything to say on the question of whether Indian tribes are states.
The Constitution is simply silent on the matter and on the related question of inherent Indian
sovereignty." Id. at 825.
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In the proverbial close call, the Eighth Circuit sitting en banc by a
5-5 vote vacated its panel decision and affirmed the district court's
opinion.6
In U.S. v. Enas, the en banc Ninth Circuit also took a divided ap-
proach. The majority took what might be called an historical ap-
proach, in which it characterized the key issue as "[w]ho prevails
when the dispute between court and Congress is neither constitu-
tional nor statutory, but a matter of common law based on history?" 66
The court concluded that the result in Duro was not required by ei-
ther the Constitution or any federal statute and therefore was a mat-
ter of federal common law and therefore subject to adjustment by
Congress. The court articulated its views thusly:
The import of this categorization [Duro was a decision based on federal
common law] is clear, for within the realm of federal common law--and
the federal common law of tribes-Congress is supreme .... Conse-
quently, Congress had the power to do exactly what it intended when it
enacted the 1990 amendments to the ICRA 67
In essence, the court found no true separation of powers issue once it
correctly categorized Duro as a decision derived solely from federal
common law.
The second approach set out in the concurrence in Enas also con-
cluded "that the Tribe proceeded under its inherent authority when
it prosecuted Enas. Although Duro temporarily restricted the reach
of tribal power, the inherent sovereignty of tribes is a question of fed-
eral common law which Congress has the authority to alter under the
Indian Commerce Clause."'
165 F.3d 1209 (8th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
United States v. Enas, 255 F.3d 662, 674 (9th Cir. 2001). The term "federal common law"
is sometimes elusive, but as the Ninth Circuit notes:
It is court-made law that is neither constitutional nor statutory. See Erwin Chermerinsky,
Federal Jurisdiction 349 (3d ed. 1999) (defining federal common law as "the development
of legally binding federal law by the federal courts in the absence of directly controlling
constitutional or statutory provisions"); Martha Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal
Common Law, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 881, 890 (1986) (defining federal common law as "any
rule of federal law created by a court .... where the substance of that rule is not clearly
suggested by federal enactments---constitutional or congressional").
Id. at 674-75. Interestingly, the Supreme Court itself has not used the term "federal common
law" in its decisionmaking in this area, relying instead on such euphemisms as "implied divesti-
ture" and "inconsistent with their dependent status." The one exception is the case of National
Farmers Union Insurance Company v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845 (1985), in which the court
explicitly acknowledged "federal common law" as a basis for federal court "arising under" juris-
diction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000). This was necessary, of course, to create a federal
jurisdictional pathway to allow federal courts to review tribal jurisdiction in the absence of any
relevant federal statute or constitutional provision.
67 Enas, 255 F.3d at 675 (citation omitted). See also Frank Pommersheim, "Our Federalism" in
the Context of Federal Courts and Tribal Courts: An Open Letter to the Federal Courts' Teaching and
Scholarly Community, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 123, 175-80 (2000).
68 Enas, 255 F.3d at 682 (Pregerson,J., concurring).
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The concurrence authored by Judge Pregerson did not focus on
"history" and separation of power concerns, but rather on the meta-
phor that "[tribal] sovereignty is a vessel that Congress may fill or
drain at its pleasure. '"69 With this metaphor in hand, Judge Pregerson
noted:
[T] he Supreme Court's decision in Duro may be viewed as a snapshot of
the tribal sovereignty vessel as it existed at the time Duro was decided.
Through the passage of the 1990 amendments, Congress added to the
vessel of tribal sovereignty by recognizing the tribes' inherent power to
prosecute members of other tribes who commit crimes on the reserva-
tion.7°
VI. A CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS: ACKNOWLEDGED OR DENIED?
Both the Eighth and Ninth Circuits ultimately found no constitu-
tional crisis at hand. Properly translating Duro into a federal com-
mon law decision, both circuits vindicated the overriding legislation
as constitutionally sound. A petition for certiorari to the United
States Supreme Court was recently denied in the Enas case 7 and the
attendant constitutional issue has therefore, at least temporarily,
been set aside. The constitutional issue acknowledged, but success-
fully resolved, according to the Eighth and Ninth Circuits, was that of
separation of powers. Congress' plenary power trumps federal com-
mon law.
While the results in both the Eighth and Ninth Circuits are both
pragmatic and conceptually appropriate, they nevertheless mask a
deeper constitutional problem that remains unacknowledged in
these discussions. This issue consists of the lack of a truly constitu-
tionalized version of tribal sovereignty and the attendant lack of pre-
cise constitutional limitations on the federal and state sovereigns'
ability to erode, and even erase, tribal sovereignty. The discussions in
these cases do not identify a source or a limit on congressional ple-
72
nary power.
69 Id. at 680 (quoting Richard A. Friedman, counsel for the government).
70Id.
71 122 S. Ct. 925 (2002).
This failure results from the unwillingness to confront the constitutional dilemma created
by the process of incorporation. While treaties and the Indian Commerce Clause were more
than adequate to deal with a tribal sovereign at the very margins of a young Republic, these
sources became increasingly inadequate from the federal government's point of view to deal
with tribes as their members became federal and state citizens, and non-Indians increasingly
became landowners and permanent residents of the reservation. Tribes were no longer out-
side, but increasingly physically, socially, and politically inside the Republic, and the Constitu-
tion needed to be revised and amended to take this reality into account. Instead of taking this
road, the Supreme Court fashioned the doctrine of plenary power to create an extraconstitu-
tional doctrine to increase federal power at the expense of tribal sovereignty. The issue of con-
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In addition, these decisions do nothing practically or conceptually
to question, much less repudiate, judicial plenary power"' as a rogue
doctrine used to curb tribal sovereignty, save when Congress re-
sponds with its paramount legislative authority. This is a power that
Congress has used quite sparingly to date. With the exception of the
Duro override, Congress has let stand the results of disturbing cases
like Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,74 Montana v. United States,75
South Dakota v. Bourland,76 Strate v. A-1 Contractors,77 Alaska v. Native Vil-
lage of Venetie Tribal Government,78 Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley,79 and
Nevada v. Hicks.80
The current Supreme Court created this doctrine and therefore it
is an unlikely source to disavow it. The foundational principles of In-
dian law" are gravely at risk as both promise and law. In the short
run, Congress must use its extensive legislative authority to curb these
denigrations of tribal sovereignty that are contrary to the longstand-
ing congressional and executive policy of meaningful self-
gressional plenary power has been exacerbated by the development of ajudicial plenary power,
where the Supreme Court now considers it within its jurisprudential domain to set limits on
tribal sovereignty (especially in regard to tribal authority over non-Indians) unless explicitly lim-
ited by Congress despite the current congressional and executive policy to support meaningful
tribal self-determination. See, e.g., Getches, supra note 3, at 352-58 for an extensive catalogue of
these congressional endorsements of self-determination.
73 See, e.g., Pommersheim, supra note 55. Other scholars have referred to this recent Su-
preme Court Indian law jurisprudence as the "new subjectivism" and a "common law for our
age of colonialism." See David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivism of
the Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1573 (1996). Professor Getches also quotes a
memorandum from Justice Scalia to Justice Brennan in which Justice Scalia characterizes the
role of the Supreme Court in Indian law as determining "what the current state of affairs ought
to be." Id. at 1575 (emphasis added). See also Philip P. Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of
Colonialism: The Judicial Divestiture of Indian Tribal Authority over Nonmembers, 109 YALE L.J. I
(1999).
74 435 U.S. 191 (1978) (holding that tribes do not have criminal jurisdiction over non-
Indians).
75 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981) (holding that tribes do not have civil regulatory authority over
non-Indians on fee land within the reservation unless there is a consensual relationship or the
conduct of non-Indians "threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the eco-
nomic security or the health or welfare of the tribe").
76 508 U.S. 679 (1993) (holding that the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe does not have regula-
toryjurisdiction over non-Indians on federal "taking land" for Oahe Dam).
77 520 U.S. 438 (1997) (holding that tribal courts do not have jurisdiction over car accidents
involving non-Indians that take place on state highways running through a reservation).
78 522 U.S. 520 (1998) (holding that Alaska Native villages are not "dependent Indian com-
munities" within the meaning of the Indian country statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1151, and therefore do
not possess any governmental authority over non-Indians).
532 U.S. 645 (2001) (holding that tribes may not assert a room tax on a non-Indian stay-
ing at a motel owned by a non-Indian and located on fee land within the reservation).
80 533 U.S. 353 (2001) (holding that the Montana test applies to events that take place on
trust land as well as fee land within the reservation, and tribal courts do not have jurisdiction
over 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuits).
81 See supra Part III; see also Getches, supra note 3, at 269-73.
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determination.2 Yet in the long run, only a constitutional amend-
ment can truly guarantee and vouchsafe an essential and enduring
tribal sovereignty.
VII. CONCLUSION: A CALL FOR NEW CONSTITUTIONAL
DIALOGUE AND REFORM
Tribal sovereignty has always existed. No one doubts this. Yet be-
cause it has never been adequately constitutionalized, tribal sover-
eignty has often been subject to congressional limitation and defea-
sance, and increasingly subject to judicial limitation through an
expanded interpretation of the process of incorporation and use of
federal common law.
It therefore seems an appropriate time to expand and to renew
thinking in the area of Indian law to more fully consider the necessity
for an amendment to the United States Constitution that expressly
recognizes tribal sovereignty. The conceptual basis for such dialogue
and understanding might properly find its roots in the principles of
treaty federalism." The essence of treaty federalism is the recogni-
tion that "treaties are a form of political recognition and a measure of
the consensual distribution of powers between tribes and the United
States." 84 In this context, treaties, according to Barsh and Henderson,
are more properly understood as compacts:
Their object is to restructure the parties and create or enlarge some
common, national sovereignty. Treaties are agreements between existing
sovereigns; compacts create new sovereigns. Since compacts alter the
fabric of government, they require the consent of the people themselves,
the same as an internal amendment of either party's constitution. Once
ratified by the people, a compact cannot be modified, dissolved or super-
seded except by the same process. It is not alliance, but the constitution
of an amalgamated body politic."
The core of treaty federalism advances a distinct dialectic that
serves to renovate the importance of treaties as being "analogous to
82 See, for example, the legislative proposal discussed in Tex Hall et al., Tribal Governance
and Economic Enhancement Initiative, Indian Country Today, Oct. 16, 2002, at A5.
83 See RUSSEL LAWRENCE BARSH & JAMES YOUNGBLOOD HENDERSON, THE ROAD: INDIAN
TRIBES AND POLITICAL LIBERTY (1980). It is worth noting that since 1980 the status of tribal sov-
ereignty has become ever more precarious. See, e.g., Getches, supra note 3. See also Richard A.
Monette, A New Federalism for Indian Tribes: The Relationship Between the United States and Tribes in
Light of Our Federalism and Republican Democracy, 25 U. TOL L. REV. 617, 633 (1994). As Profes-
sor Clinton has noted: "One important theme.., is to encourage a dialogue on the importance
of developing positive structural relationships between [sic] the federal, state, and tribal gov-
ernments that will support full tribal government participation within the federal union."
Clinton, supra note 4, at 936.
84 BARSH & HENDERSON, supra note 83, at 270.
8 Id. at 271.
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the Constitution itself."86  Treaty federalism concedes the facts of
tribal absorption into the national politic and the practical inability to
withdraw. Yet it does not concede a crumbling stasis, but pushes for-
ward to another dynamic possibility:
If tribes can no longer remove themselves from the Union, it is all the
more essential that their political rights be secured on a fixed and certain
basis. In an alliance of sovereigns, the ultimate relief from oppression is
exit. In a national compact, the only safety is in the architecture of its
constitution and laws.8
7
Such an amendment would have two broad constitutive elements:
one that defines the powers of the tribal sovereign, and a second that
defines the relationship of the tribal sovereign to the federal and
state sovereigns with a specific focus on the limitations on the ability
of these sovereigns to invade or to interfere with tribal sovereignty.
This is not an easy task, and surely it will take much tribal wisdom,
lawyerly craft, and political acumen to succeed.89 Yet in seeking a se-
cure and vital future for tribal sovereignty, it makes sense to appeal to
Id. at 274 ("Regardless of their [i.e. treaties] original intent, they have resulted in a com-
plete political and economic integration of tribes into the federal system. Separation is practi-
cally, impossible.").
Id at 275.
88 In fact, the architects of treaty federalism have begun this process as well:
We propose to begin with the following language:
Section 1. Except as provided by this amendment, Indian Tribes shall be deemed "States"
for all purposes under this Constitution.
Section 2. All Constitutional powers of State self-government not hereafter expressly
delegated to the United Sates by the vote of three-fourths of the members of an Indian
Tribe are reserved by that tribe, and cannot be divested by Congress.
Section 3. The reserved powers of an Indian Tribe shall include, but not be limited to,
the power to regulate behavior and tax persons and property within the exterior
boundaries of its territory, concurrent only with the general Constitutional authority of
the United States.
Section 4. Tribes shall have power to fix criteria for membership notwithstanding the
second clause of the second section of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 280. This process is also properly grounded in the necessity of obtaining tribal consent:
Section 8. This amendment shall apply only to those Indian Tribes which were incorpo-
rated by a constitution of their choosing for five years prior to the date of ratification,
and which may consent to its application to them by the vote of two-thirds of their mem-
bers in a plebiscite convened for that purpose.
Id. at 282. Such an approach is necessarily based on a "consent" model. Id.
For example, Article V of the Constitution requires ratification of amendments by the
"Legislatures of three fourths of the several States." Yet national constitutions elsewhere have
been successfully amended. See, e.g., Constitution of Canada, § 35 (1982):
(1) The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are
hereby recognized and affirmed.
(2) In this Act, "aboriginal peoples of Canada" includes the Indian, Inuit and M~tis peo-
ples of Canada.
(3) For greater certainty, in subsection (1) "treaty rights" includes rights that now exist
by way of land claims agreements or may be so acquired.
(4) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the aboriginal and treaty rights re-
ferred to in subsection (1) are guaranteed equally to male and female persons.
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the aspiration and tradition of a living constitution to truly become all
that it can be for those who were here first.90
90 Such an understanding no doubt will require a certain constitutional "faith:"
The point of this constitutional "faith" is to identify a fruitful path in the evolving rela-
tionship of tribal courts and federal courts. This path begins in the past with an under-
standing of mutuality grounded in principles of treaty federalism, then moves to sweep
aside the plenary brambles, and finally clears the way to complete a constitutional jour-
ney. In other words, this emerging "faith" seeks a way that respects both the aspirations
of tribal courts to flourish and a national jurisprudence that regards arbitrary power as
constitutionally indefensible. Without such "faith" and conscientious effort, there is little
hope for meaningful growth and stability but only the likelihood of a kind of blind and
erratic development that potentially exposes tribal courts (and tribes in general) to the
"decisive operations of merciless power." The presence of such a "faith" is needed to
provide both confident institutional grounding and principled constitutional assurance.
Pommersheim, supra note 55, at 330-31 (footnote omitted).
